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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial
examples, even in the black-box case, where the attacker is
limited to solely query access. Existing black-box approaches
to generating adversarial examples typically require a sig-
nificant number of queries, either for training a substitute
network or estimating gradients from the output scores. We
introduce GenAttack, a gradient-free optimization tech-
nique which uses genetic algorithms for synthesizing adver-
sarial examples in the black-box setting. Our experiments
on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets show that
GenAttack can successfully generate visually impercepti-
ble adversarial examples against state-of-the-art image recog-
nition models with orders of magnitude fewer queries than
existing approaches. For example, in our CIFAR-10 experi-
ments, GenAttack required roughly 2,568 times less queries
than the current state-of-the-art black-box attack. Furthermore,
we show that GenAttack can successfully attack both the
state-of-the-art ImageNet defense, ensemble adversarial train-
ing, and non-differentiable, randomized input transformation
defenses. GenAttack’s success against ensemble adversar-
ial training demonstrates that its query efficiency enables it
to exploit the defense’s weakness to direct black-box attacks.
GenAttack’s success against non-differentiable input trans-
formations indicates that its gradient-free nature enables it to
be applicable against defenses which perform gradient mask-
ing/obfuscation to confuse the attacker. Our results suggest
that evolutionary algorithms open up a promising area of re-
search into effective gradient-free black-box attacks.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved state-of-the-
art performance in various tasks in machine learning and
artificial intelligence, such as image classification, speech
recognition, machine translation and game-playing. Despite
their effectiveness, recent studies have illustrated the vulnera-
bility of DNNs to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2013;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). For instance, a vir-
tually imperceptible perturbation to an image can lead a well-
trained DNN to misclassify. Targeted adversarial examples
can even cause misclassification to a chosen class. Moreover,
researchers have shown that these adversarial examples are
still effective in the physical world (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016; Athalye et al. 2017), and can be crafted in dis-
tinct data modalities, such as in the natural language (Alzan-
tot et al. 2018), and speech (Alzantot, Balaji, and Srivastava
2017) domains. The lack of robustness exhibited by DNNs to
adversarial examples has raised serious concerns for security-
critical applications.
Nearly all previous work on adversarial attacks, (Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi,
and Frossard 2016; Gu and Rigazio 2014; Kurakin, Good-
fellow, and Bengio 2016) has used gradient-based optimiza-
tion in order to find successful adversarial examples. How-
ever, gradient computation can only be performed when the
attacker has full knowledge of the model architecture and
weights. Thus, these methods are only applicable in the white-
box setting, where an attacker is given full access and control
over a targeted DNN. However, when attacking real-world
systems, one needs to consider the problem of performing
adversarial attacks in the black-box setting, where nothing is
revealed about the network architecture, parameters, or train-
ing data. In such a case, the attacker only has access to the
input-output pairs of the classifier. Dominant approaches
in this setting have relied on attacking trained substitute
networks, and hoping the generated examples transfer to
the target model (Papernot et al. 2017). This approach suf-
fers from imperfect transferability and the computational
cost of training a substitute network. Recent work has used
coordinate-based finite difference methods in order to directly
estimate the gradients from the confidence scores, however
the attacks are still computationally expensive, relying on
optimization tricks to remain tractable (Chen et al. 2017b).
Both approaches are very query-intensive, thus limiting their
practicality in real-world scenarios.
Motivated by the above, we present GenAttack, a novel
approach to generating adversarial examples without hav-
ing to compute or even approximate the gradients, enabling
the solution to scale to the black-box case. In order to per-
form gradient-free optimization, we adopt a population-based
approach using genetic algorithms, iteratively evolving a pop-
ulation of feasible solutions until success. By simultaneously
pursuing multiple hypotheses, GenAttack is more resilient
to poor local minima and can efficiently explore the solution
space (Such et al. 2018). In addition, by being gradient-free,
GenAttack is naturally robust to defenses which perform
gradient masking or obfuscation (Athalye, Carlini, and Wag-
ner 2018). Thus, unlike current approaches, GenAttack
can efficiently craft perturbations in the black-box setting
which can effectively fool not only state-of-the-art classi-
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fiers but recently proposed defenses which manipulate the
gradients.
We evaluate GenAttack using state-of-the-art image
classification models, and find that the algorithm is success-
ful at performing targeted black-box attacks with signifi-
cantly less queries than current approaches. For example, in
our CIFAR-10 experiments, GenAttack required roughly
2,568 times less queries than the current state-of-the-art black-
box attack. Furthermore, unlike current solutions, we find that
GenAttack can successfully execute targeted attacks on
the large-scale ImageNet dataset (Deng et al. 2009), demon-
strating its practicality. Additionally, we also demonstrate
the success of GenAttack against ensemble adversarial
training (Tramèr et al. 2017), the state-of-the-art ImageNet
defense, and randomized, non-differentiable input transfor-
mation defenses (Guo, Rana, and van der Maaten 2017).
These results illustrate the power of GenAttack’s query
efficiency and gradient-free nature.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce GenAttack, a novel gradient-free ap-
proach for generating adversarial examples by leverag-
ing population-based optimization. Upon acceptance, our
implementation will be released as open-source.
• We show that in the restricted black-box setting,
GenAttack can generate adversarial examples which
force state-of-the-art image classification models to mis-
classify examples to chosen target labels with significantly
less queries than current approaches.
• We demonstrate that unlike current approaches,
GenAttack can generate successful targeted adver-
sarial examples on the large-scale ImageNet dataset,
demonstrating its ability to perform in realistic scenarios.
• We further highlight the effectiveness of GenAttack by
illustrating its success against state-of-art ImageNet de-
fenses, namely against ensemble adversarial training and
non-differentiable, randomized input transformations. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present a
successful black-box attack against these defenses.
Related Work
In what follows, we summarize recent approaches for gener-
ating adversarial examples, in both the white-box and black-
box cases, as well as defending against adversarial examples.
Please refer to the cited works for further detail.
White-box attacks & Transferability
In the white-box case, attackers have complete knowledge of
and full access to the targeted DNN. In this scenario, the ad-
versary is able to use backpropagation for gradient computa-
tion, which obviously increases the strength of gradient-based
attacks.
White-box attacks can also be used in black-box cases by
taking advantage of transferability. Transferability refers to
the property that adversarial examples generated using one
model are often misclassified by another model. The substi-
tute model approach to black-box attacks takes advantage of
this property to generate successful adversarial examples.
L-BFGS (Szegedy et al. 2013) argues that the reason for
existence of adversarial examples is the occurrence of blind-
spots in neural networks. They use box-constraint L-BFGS
to solve the following optimization problem.
minimize ||δ||2 subject to
f(x+ δ) = l
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]m
where f : Rm → {1, ., ., k} is the classifier mapping func-
tion that maps input image to a discrete label. l ∈ {1, ., ., k}
is the target output label. δ is the added noise.
FGSM & I-FGSM In (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014), the authors proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM), a quick and reliable approach for generating ad-
versarial examples. Let x0 and x denote the original and
adversarial examples, respectively, and let t denote the target
class to attack. FGSM uses the gradient ∇J of the training
loss J with respect to x0 for crafting adversarial examples.
An L∞ attack, x is crafted by
x = x0 −  · sign(∇J(x0, t)), (1)
where  specifies the L∞ distortion between x and x0, and
sign(∇J) takes the sign of the gradient. Untargeted attacks
can be implemented in a similar fashion. In (Kurakin, Good-
fellow, and Bengio 2016), an iterative version of FGSM was
proposed (I-FGSM), where FGSM is used iteratively with a
finer distortion, followed by an -ball clipping. In (Madry et
al. 2017), PGD is introduced, where I-FGSM is modified to
incorporate random starts.
C&W& EAD Instead of leveraging the training loss, Car-
lini and Wagner designed an L2-regularized loss function
based on the logit layer representation in DNNs for crafting
adversarial examples (Carlini and Wagner 2017). Its formula-
tion is as follows:
minimizex c · f(x, t) + ‖x− x0‖22
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p, (2)
where f(x, t) is the logit layer loss function. By increasing
κ, one increases the necessary margin between the predicted
probability of the target class and that of the rest, generating
stronger adversarial examples with increased distortion. The
untargeted attack formulation is similar. EAD generalizes the
C&W attack by incorporating L1 minimization via perform-
ing elastic-net regularization (Chen et al. 2017a), and has
been shown to generate more robust, transferable adversarial
examples (Sharma and Chen 2017; Sharma and Chen 2018;
Lu et al. 2018).
Black-box attacks
In the literature, the black-box attack setting has been re-
ferred to as the case where an attacker has free access to
the input and output of a targeted DNN but is unable to per-
form back propagation on the network. Proposed approaches
have relied on transferability and gradient estimation, and are
summarized below.
Substitute Networks Early approaches to black-box at-
tacks made use of the power of free query to train a substitute
model, a representative substitute of the targeted DNN (Pa-
pernot et al. 2017). The substitute DNN can then be attacked
using any white-box technique, and the generated adversarial
examples are used to attack the target DNN. As the substi-
tute model is trained to be representative of a targeted DNN
in terms of its classification rules, adversarial attacks to a
substitute model are expected to be similar to attacking the
corresponding targeted DNN. This approach however relies
on the transferability property rather than directly attack-
ing the target DNN, which is imperfect and thus limits the
strength of the adversary. Furthermore, training a substitute
model is computationally expensive and hardly feasible when
attacking large models, such as Inception-v3 (Szegedy et al.
2015).
ZOO Due to the unfavorable properties of existing ap-
proaches, ZOO was proposed (Chen et al. 2017b). ZOO
builds on the C&W attack, due to its state-of-the-art per-
formance, and modifies the loss function such that it only
depends on the output of the DNN, as opposed to depending
on the logit layer representation. Furthermore, an approxi-
mate gradient is computed using the finite difference method
on the targeted DNN, and the optimization problem is solved
via zeroth order optimization.
For each coordinate, 2 function evaluations are required
to estimate the gradient. Performing this computation for all
coordinates quickly becomes too expensive in practice. To re-
solve this issue, stochastic coordinate descent is used, which
only requires 2 function evaluations for each step. Still, when
attacking large black-box networks, such as Inception-v3,
computation is quite slow and thus a dimension reduction
transformation on the perturbation is applied. With these op-
timizations, unlike the substitute model approach, attacking
Inception-v3 becomes computationally tractable. However,
as we demonstrate in our experimental results, the attack is
still quite query-inefficient and thus limited in power and
impractical for attacking real-world systems.
Recently we became aware of work that also aims to im-
prove the efficiency and strength of black-box adversarial
attacks, such as (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2018) and
(Ilyas et al. 2018). However, our work remains unique in its
goal and approach. Unlike us, (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge
2018) focus on attacking black-box models with only par-
tial access to the query results, however they do not address
the query efficiency problem. Notably, their method takes,
on average, about 12x more queries than ours to achieve
success against an undefended ImageNet model. Likewise,
(Ilyas et al. 2018) also target a similar contribution, but their
approach is still reliant on gradient estimation and was not
shown to succeed against state-of-the-art defenses. We treat
these contributions as parallel work.
Defending against adversarial attacks
Adversarial Training Adversarial training is typically im-
plemented by augmenting the original training dataset with
the label-corrected adversarial examples to retrain the net-
work. In (Madry et al. 2017), a high capacity network is
trained against L∞-constrained PGD, I-FGSM with random
starts, which is deemed to be the strongest attack utilizing the
local first-order information about the network. It has been
shown that the defense is less robust to attacks optimized
on other distortion metrics, namely L1 (Sharma and Chen
2017). In (Tramèr et al. 2017), training data is augmented
with perturbations transferred from other models, and was
demonstrated to have strong robustness to transferred adver-
sarial examples. We demonstrate in our experimental results
that its less robust to query-efficient black-box attacks, such
as GenAttack.
Gradient Obfuscation It has been identified that many
recently proposed defenses provide apparent robustness to
strong adversarial attacks by manipulating the gradients to
either be nonexistent or incorrect, dependent on test-time
randomness, or simply unusable. Specifically, it was found
in analyzing the ICLR 2018 non-certified defenses that claim
white-box robustness, 7 of 9 relied on this phenomenon (Atha-
lye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). It has also been shown that
adversarial training learns to succeed by making the gradients
point in the wrong direction (Tramèr et al. 2017).
One defense which relies upon gradient obfuscation is
utilizing input transformations. In (Guo, Rana, and van der
Maaten 2017), transformations based on image cropping
and rescaling, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, total
variance minimization, and image quilting were explored.
These transformations are clearly non-differentiable, forc-
ing gradient-based attackers to rely upon transferability. In
addition, transformations like total variance minimization
are randomized. In the white-box case, this defense can be
successfully attacked by forward propagating through the
transformation as usual, but on the backward pass, replac-
ing the non-differentiable transformation with the identity
function (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). Though this
approach is effective, it is only applicable when the attacker
both has knowledge of the non-differentiable component and
can backpropagate the network. We demonstrate in our ex-
perimental results that GenAttack, being gradient-free and
thus impervious to said gradient manipulation, can naturally
handle such procedures in the black-box case.
Threat Model
We consider the following attack scenario. The attacker does
not have knowledge about the network architecture, parame-
ters, or training data. The attacker is solely capable of query-
ing the target model as a black-box function:
f : Rd → [0, 1]K
where d is the number of input features and K is the number
of classes. The output of function f is the set of model pre-
diction scores. Note, that the attacker will not have access to
intermediate values computed in the network hidden layers,
including the logits.
The goal of the attacker is to perform a targeted attack.
Formally speaking, given a benign input example x that is
correctly classified by the model, the attacker seeks to find a
perturbed example xadv for which the network will produce
the desired target prediction t chosen by the attacker from the
set of labels {1..K}. Additionally, the attacker also seeks to
minimize the Lp distance, in order to maintain the perceptual
similarity between xorig and xadv . I.e.,
argmax
c∈{1..K}
f(xadv)c = t
such that
||x− xadv||p ≤ δ
where the distance norm function Lp is often chosen as L2
or L∞.
This threat model is equivalent to that of prior work in
black-box attacks (Chen et al. 2017b; Papernot et al. 2017),
and is similar to the chosen-plain-text attack (CPA) in cryp-
tography, where an attacker provides the victim with any
chosen plain-text message and observes its encryption cipher
output.
GenAttack Algorithm
GenAttack relies on genetic algorithms, which are
population-based gradient-free optimization strategies. Ge-
netic algorithms are inspired by the process of natural selec-
tion, iteratively evolving a population of candidate solutions
towards better solutions. The population in each iteration
is a called a generation. In each generation, the quality of
population members is evaluated using a fitness function.
“Fitter” solutions are more likely to be selected for breed-
ing the next generation. The next generation is generated
through a combination of crossover and mutation. Crossover
is the process of taking more than one parent solution and
producing a child solution from them; it is analogous to repro-
duction and biological crossover. In addition, at each iteration,
a small random mutation to the population members occurs
during evolution, according to a small user-defined mutation
probability. This is done in order to increase the diversity of
population members and provide better exploration of the
search space.
Algorithm 1 describes the operation of GenAttack. The
input for the algorithm is the original image xorig and the
target classification label t chosen by the attacker. The al-
gorithm computes an adversarial image xadv such that the
model classifies xadv as t and ||xorig−xadv||∞ ≤ δmax. We
define the population size to be N , the mutation probability
to be ρ, and the step-size to be α.
GenAttack initializes a population of examples around
the given input example xorig by applying independent
and uniformly distributed random noise in the range
(−α δmax, α δmax) to each dimension of the input vector
xorig with probability ρ. Then repeatedly, until a successful
example is found, each population members’ fitness is evalu-
ated, parents are selected, and crossover & mutation
are performed to form the next generation.
The subroutine ComputeFitness evaluates the fitness,
i.e. quality, of each population member. As the fitness func-
tion should reflect the optimization objective, a reasonable
choice would be to use the output score given to the target
class label directly. However, we find it more efficient to
also jointly motivate the decrease in the probability of other
classes. We also find that the use of log proves to be helpful
Algorithm 1 GenAttack (Targeted case)
Input: original example xorig, target label t, maximum
L∞ distance δmax, step-size α, mutation probability ρ,
population size N .
for i = 1, ..., N in population do
P0i ← xorig +Bernoulli(ρ) ∗ U(−α δmax, α δmax)
end for
for g = 1, 2...G generations do
for i = 1, ..., N in population do
F g−1i = ComputeF itness(Pg−1i )
end for
xadv = Pg−1argmaxj F g−1j
if argmaxc f(xadv)c == t then
Return: xadv . { Found successful attack}
end if
Pg1 = {xadv}
probs = Normalize(F g−1)
for i = 2, ..., N in population do
Sample parent1 from Pg−1 according to probs
Sample parent2 from Pg−1 according to probs
child = Crossover(parent1, parent2)
. {Apply mutations.}
childmut = child + Bernoulli(ρ)∗ ↪→
U(−α δmax, α δmax)
. {Add mutated child to next generation}.
Pgi = {childmut}
end for
end for
in avoiding numeric instability issues. Therefore, we pick the
following function:
ComputeF itness(x) = log f(x)t − logmax
c 6=t
f(x)c
Population members at each iteration are ranked according
to their fitness value. Members with higher fitness are more
likely to be a part of the next generation while members with
lower fitness are more likely to be replaced. We compute
the probability of selection for each population member by
normalizing the fitness values into a probability distribution.
Then, we stochastically and independently select random
parent pairs among the population members according to that
distribution. In addition to that, the elite member, the one
with highest fitness, is guaranteed to become a member of
the next generation.
After selection, parents are mated together to produce
members of the next generation. A child is generated by
selecting the feature value from either parent1, or parent2
according to the selection probabilities:
prob(parent1) =
fitness(parent_1)
fitness(parent_1) + fitness(parent_2)
prob(parent1) =
fitness(parent_2)
fitness(parent_1) + fitness(parent_2)
To encourage diversity among the population members and
promote exploration of the search space, at the end of each
iteration, population members can be subject to mutation,
according to probability ρ. Random noise uniformly sampled
in the range (−α δmax, α δmax) is applied to individual fea-
tures of the chosen population member. Finally, clipping is
performed to ensure that the pixel values are within the per-
missible L∞ distance away from the benign example xorig.
Results
We evaluate GenAttack by running experiments attacking
state-of-art MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet image classi-
fication models. For each dataset, we use the same models
as used in the ZOO work (Chen et al. 2017b). For MNIST
and CIFAR-10, the model accuracies are 99.5% and 80%,
respectively. The reader can refer to (Carlini and Wagner
2017) for more details on the architecture of those models.
For ImageNet, we use Inception-v3 (Szegedy et al. 2015),
which achieves 94.4% top-5 accuracy and 78.8% top-1 accu-
racy. We compare the effectiveness of GenAttack to ZOO
on these models in terms of the attack success rate (ASR),
the runtime, and the median number of queries necessary for
success. The runtime and query count statistics are computed
over successful attacks only. A single query means an evalua-
tion of the target model output on a single input image. Using
the authors’ code 1, we configure ZOO for each dataset based
on the implementations the authors used for generating their
experimental results (Chen et al. 2017b). We also evaluate
against the state-of-the-art white-box C&W attack, assuming
direct access to the model, to give perspective on runtime.
In addition, we evaluate the effectiveness of GenAttack
against ensemble adversarial training (Tramèr et al. 2017),
using models released by the authors at the following link 2.
Ensemble adversarial training is considered to be the state-
of-art ImageNet defense against black-box attacks, proven to
be effective at providing robustness against transfer attacks
during the NIPS 2017 Competition on Defenses against Ad-
versarial Attacks (Tramèr et al. 2017; Kurakin et al. 2018).
Finally, we evaluate against recently proposed randomized,
non-differentiable input transformation defenses (Guo, Rana,
and van der Maaten 2017) to test GenAttack’s performance
against gradient obfuscation. We find that GenAttack can
handle such defenses as-is due to its gradient-free nature.
Hyperparameters For all of our MNIST and CIFAR-
10 experiments, we limit GenAttack to a maximum of
100,000 queries, and fix the hyperparameters to the follow-
ing values: mutation probability ρ = 5e−2, population size
N = 6, and step-size α = 1.0. For all of our ImageNet ex-
periments, as the images are nearly 100x larger than those
of CIFAR-10, we use a maximum of 1,000,000 queries and
lower ρ to 1e−4. To match the mean L∞ distortion com-
puted over successful examples of ZOO, and thereby make
the query comparison fair, we set δmax = {0.3, 0.05, 0.05},
for our MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet experiments, re-
spectively. To encourage further work and easily enable re-
producibility, we are releasing our code as open source upon
1https://github.com/huanzhang12/ZOO-Attack
2https://github.com/tensorflow/models/
tree/master/research/adv_imagenet_models
acceptance 3.
Query Comparison
We compare GenAttack and ZOO by number of queries
necessary to achieve success, and provide C&W white-box
results to put the runtime in perspective. For all experiments,
we use an AMD Threadripper 1950X CPU with a single
NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU. For MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
ImageNet, we use 1000, 1000, and 100 randomly selected
correctly classified images from the test sets. For each image,
we select a random target label. Table 1 shows the results of
our experiment. The results show that both ZOO and GenAt-
tack can succeed on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets,
however GenAttack is 2,126 times and 2,568 times more
efficient on each. Furthermore, unlike ZOO, GenAttack is ac-
tually slightly computationally faster than C&W, a white-box
attack, on MNIST and CIFAR-10. On ImageNet, ZOO is not
able to succeed consistently in the targeted case, is still quite
query inefficient, and has exceptional computational cost (see
runtime)4. This is significant as it shows that, unlike current
black-box approaches, GenAttack is efficient enough to
effectively scale to ImageNet.
A randomly selected set of MNIST and CIFAR-10 test
images and their associated adversarial examples targeted
to each other label are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. An
ImageNet test image with its associated adversarial example
is shown in Figure 3.
Attacking Ensemble Adversarial Training
Ensemble adversarial training incorporates adversarial inputs
generated on other already trained models into the model’s
training data in order to increase its robustness to adversarial
examples (Tramèr et al. 2017). This has proven to be the most
effective approach at providing robustness against transfer-
based black-box attacks during the NIPS 2017 Competition.
We demonstrate that the defense is much less robust against
query-efficient black-box attacks, such as GenAttack.
We performed an experiment to evaluate the
effectiveness of GenAttack against ensem-
ble adversarially trained models released by the
authors, namely Ens4AdvInceptionV3 and
EnsAdvInceptionResNetv2. We use the same
100 randomly sampled test images and targets used in our
previous ImageNet experiments. We find that GenAttack
is able to achieve 93% success and 88% success against
both models, respectively, significantly outperforming ZOO.
In Table 2, we compare the success rate and median query
count between the ensemble adversarially trained and the
vanilla Inception-v3 models. Our comparison shows that
these positive results are yielded with only a limited increase
in query count. We additionally note that the max L∞ used
for evaluation in the NIPS 2017 competition was varied
3 https://github.com/nesl/adversarial_
genattack.git
4 Each iteration, ZOO performs 2*128 queries at once. This
would not be possible attacking a real-world system, as queries
would have to be iterative, thus the runtime statistics are artificially
low.
Figure 1: MNIST adversarial examples generated by
GenAttack. Row label is the true label and column
label is the target label.
Figure 2: CIFAR-10 adversarial examples generated by
GenAttack. Row label is the true label and column label
is the target label.
MNIST (L∞ = 0.30) CIFAR-10 (L∞ = 0.05) ImageNet (L∞ = 0.05)
ASR Queries Runtime ASR Queries Runtime ASR Queries Runtime
C&W 100% – 0.006 hr 100% – 0.006 hr 100% – 0.025 hr
ZOO 98% 2,118,222 0.013 hr 93.3% 2,064,798 0.025 hr 18% 2,611,456 2.25 hr
GenAttack 100% 996 0.002 hr 96.5% 804 0.001 hr 100% 97,493 0.51 hr
Table 1: Attack success rate (ASR), median number of queries, and mean runtime for the C&W (white-box) attack, ZOO, and
GenAttack with equivalent L∞ distortion. Query and runtime statistics are computed only over successful examples. Number
of queries is not a concern for C&W because it is a white-box attack.
InceptionV3 Ens4AdvInceptionV3
ASR Queries ASR Queries
GenAttack 100% 97,493 93% 163,995
ZOO 18% 2,611,456 6% 3,584,623
C&W 100% - 100% -
Table 2: Comparison of GenAttack results (w/ L∞ =
0.05) against ZOO and C&W (white-box) in attacking the
vanilla and ensemble adversarially trained Inception-v3 mod-
els. Query counts are computed over successful examples.
between 4 and 16, which when normalized equals 0.02 and
0.06, respectively. Our δmax (0.05) falls in this range.
Attacking Non-Differentiable, Randomized Input
Transformations
Non-differentiable input transformations perform gradient
obfuscation, relying upon manipulating the gradients to suc-
ceed against gradient-based attackers (Athalye, Carlini, and
CIFAR-10 ImageNet
ASR Queries ASR Queries
Bit depth 93% 2,796 100% 116,739
JPEG 88% 3,541 89% 190,680
TVM 70% 5,888 x 32 – –
Table 3: Evaluation of GenAttack against non-
differentiable and randomized input transformation
defenses. We use L∞ = 0.05 for bit-depth, and L∞ = 0.15
for JPEG and TVM experiments.
Wagner 2018). In addition, randomized transformations in-
crease the difficulty for the attacker to guarantee success. One
can circumvent such approaches by modifying the core de-
fense module performing the gradient obfuscation, however
this is clearly not applicable in the black-box case.
In (Guo, Rana, and van der Maaten 2017), a number of
input transformations were explored, including bit-depth re-
duction, JPEG compression, and total variance minimiza-
tion. Bit-depth reduction and JPEG compression are non-
differentiable, while total variance minimization introduces
Figure 3: Adversarial example generated by GenAttack
against the InceptionV3 model (L∞ = 0.05). Left
figure: original, right figure: adversarial example.
Figure 4: Adversarial example generated by GenAttack
against the JPEG compression defense (L∞ = 0.15). Left
figure: original, right figure: adversarial example.
additional randomization and is quite slow, making it diffi-
cult to iterate upon. We demonstrate that GenAttack can
succeed against these input transformations in the black-box
case, due to its gradient-free nature making it impervious
to gradient obfuscation. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to demonstrate a black-box algorithm which can
bypass such defenses. Our results are summarized in Table 3.
For bit-depth reduction, 3 bits were reduced, while for
JPEG compression, the quality level was set to 75, as
in (Guo, Rana, and van der Maaten 2017). GenAttack
is able to achieve high success rate against both non-
differentiable transformations, on both the CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets. A visual example of our results against
JPEG compression is shown in Figure 4.
Total variance minimization (TVM) introduces an addi-
tional challenge as it is not only non-differentiable, but it
also introduces randomization and is an exceedingly slow
procedure. TVM randomly drops many of the pixels (dropout
rate of 50%, as in (Guo, Rana, and van der Maaten 2017)) in
the original image and reconstructs the input image from the
remaining pixels by solving a denoising optimization prob-
lem. Due to randomization, the classifier returns a different
score at each run for the same input, confusing the attacker.
Succeeding against randomization requires more iterations,
but iterating upon the defense is difficult due to the slow
speed of the optimization.
However, as the ComputeFitness function can be gen-
eralized to be
ComputeF itness(x) = E
r
[log f(x, r)t − logmax
c6=t
f(x, r)c]
where f(x, r) is the randomization-defended model query
function and r is the noise input to the TVM function,
GenAttack can still handle this defense in the black-box
case. The expectation is computed by querying the model t
times (we used t = 32) for every population member to ob-
tain a robust fitness score at the cost of an increased number
of queries. Due to the computational complexity of applying
TVM on each query, we performed the TVM experiment
only using the CIFAR-10 dataset and achieved 70% success
with L∞ = 0.15. Due to the large randomization introduced
by TVM, we counted an adversarial example as success only
if it is classified as the target label three times in a row. No-
tably, TVM significantly decreases the model accuracy on
clean inputs (e.g. in our CIFAR-10 experiments, from 80%
to 40%) unless the model is re-trained with transformed ex-
amples (Guo, Rana, and van der Maaten 2017).
Comparison to ZOO and C&W: Due to the non-
differentiable nature of the input transformations, the C&W
attack, a gradient-based attack, can not succeed without ma-
nipulating the non-differentiable component, as discussed
in (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). In the white-box
case, this method can be applied to yield high success rate,
but is not applicable in the more restricted black-box case. In
the black-box setting, ZOO achieved 8% and 0% against the
non-differentiable bit-depth reduction and JPEG compression
defenses on ImageNet, again demonstrating its impracticality.
Conclusion
GenAttack is a powerful and efficient black-box at-
tack which uses a gradient-free optimization scheme via
adopting a population-based approach using genetic algo-
rithms. We evaluated GenAttack by attacking well-trained
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet models, and found that
GenAttack is successful at performing targeted black-box
attacks against these models with not only significantly less
queries than the current state-of-the-art, but additionally
can succeed on ImageNet, which current approaches are
incapable of scaling to. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
GenAttack can succeed against ensemble adversarial train-
ing, the state-of-the-art ImageNet defense, with only a limited
increase in queries. Finally, we showed that GenAttack can
succeed against gradient obfuscation, due to its gradient-free
nature, namely through evaluating against non-differentiable
input transformations, and can even succeed against random-
ized ones by generalizing the fitness function to compute an
expectation over the transformation. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first demonstration of a black-box attack
which can succeed against these state-of-the-art defenses.
Our results suggest that population-based optimization opens
up a promising research direction into effective gradient-free
black-box attacks.
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